

## LESSON SEVEN

### CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

MQS MANUAL TASKS: 01-9019.00-0001

#### OVERVIEW

##### TASK DESCRIPTION:

Learn the differences between planning for a campaign in war and planning one for operations other than war.

##### LEARNING OBJECTIVES:

**TASK:** Identify the considerations that cause campaign planning for OOTW to differ from planning for war

**CONDITIONS:** Given the subcourse material for this lesson, a training scenario, and extracts, as applicable, the student will complete the practical exercise to identify the differences between planning for a campaign in war and planning one for OOTW.

**STANDARDS:** The student will demonstrate his comprehension and knowledge of the task by identifying the considerations which characterize OOTW campaign planning, causing it to differ from planning for war.

**REFERENCES:** The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publication:

The proposed final publication of Joint Pub 3-07, Military Operations Short of War, November 1992

## CHAPTER VII

### CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR

1. Introduction. The doctrinal foundation for campaign planning is contained in Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," and Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning of Joint Operations." Formats for campaign plans are contained in Joint Pub 3-0 and Joint Pub 5-00.1, JTTP for Joint Campaign Planning. Campaign plans are not included within the formal joint planning and execution system. However, together with the combatant commander's strategies, they do influence planning for unified and joint operations at both the national and theater levels.

Within the context of joint operations planning, plans for operations short of war are termed "other plans" and are prepared according to procedures prescribed by the combatant commander. Therefore, this chapter provides general guidelines to be used by combatant commands in developing more detailed mission guidance for subordinate commanders and staffs involved in building the theater campaign plan within a short of war environment.

2. Campaign Planning Considerations. The multifaceted nature of the short of war environment requires emphasis on the following:

a. Many short of war activities are currently being executed with operations orders. Campaign planning is a continuing, deliberate planning process, broad in nature, and requiring ongoing military support of specific national goals and objectives. A major task for campaign planners is to focus attention not only on operations in the current campaign, but also on planning the next campaign. The plan should continually develop as the situation changes and new opportunities present themselves.

b. Campaign plans are developed when a series of related military operations are required to achieve strategic or operational objectives. Aspects of campaign planning for the short of war environment should be embodied in a combatant commander's peacetime multinational strategy when the strategy involves the application of military resources in one or more of the five operational categories in the short of war environment.

c. The key difference between campaign planning for operations short of war versus for war is that in operations short of war, other US Government agencies and host nations have a preeminent role and the military contribution to the strategic objective is likely to be indirect. A campaign plan that does not have the active participation of the Department of State and the affected host nation(s) will not work. Therefore, the major challenge is joint, combined and interagency consensus building. This difference is more clear when discussing the relationship between war and operations short of war.

(1) War is an extension of the political condition in which the principal military activity or operation is combat and the military instrument of national power is used directly.

(2) In the short of war environment, political/diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments must be used in an orchestrated effort.

(3) The conditions that exist in the short of war environment cannot be defined in military terms alone. In many cases, the conditions which need to be created can only occur with emphasis on political/diplomatic, economic, or social

activities. As the objective may be different, so too will be the sequence of events. In conventional war, the combatant commander is likely to focus on an objective involving the destruction of main enemy forces, command and control, logistics areas, or lines of communication. In the short of war environment, the objective surrounds the issue of legitimacy or willing acceptance of the right of a government, as perceived by its populace, to govern. Sequencing events to establish the conditions for legitimacy requires the application of resources to accomplish predominately psychological objectives. The accomplishment of these psychological objectives requires the synchronized coordination of each instrument of national power.

d. Interagency actions to accomplish campaign planning in a short of war environment are critical. Usually, the Department of State and other US Government agencies are participants with very important, and sometimes decisive, roles in the campaign. As the conditions and sequence differ, so do the resources applied to the campaign.

(1) The campaign planner is given, or must discern, the strategic aim. Ideally, political, economic, psychological, social, and military factors should be considered at the national level before strategic guidance is given to the combatant commander. In reality, this may not be the case, and the combatant commander may be faced with the situation of assessing the strategic situation and conducting a detailed mission analysis upon which to base the theater military strategy. Because of the preeminence of the US Ambassador in each country in the region, the combatant commander's staff must consult and coordinate with the Country Teams. The strategic aim is subject to change or modification as national objectives change or the local or global situation changes.

(2) Campaign plans are limited by many factors. In addition to funding, these factors may include laws, political consensus, the news media, and popular support. Extensive interaction with nonmilitary assets may also control how resources are applied. This interaction may be especially important as the political/diplomatic instrument is in the lead in campaigns conducted in a short of war environment. The commander must consider not only other US Government agencies but also limiting factors associated with the ability of the host country to accommodate and use US technology, doctrine, and tactics.

3. Methodology for Developing the Theater Campaign Plan. Developing a theater campaign plan for a short of war environment requires consideration of the following:

a. The countries or subregions of primary interest should be analyzed to determine who receives the limited resources.

Traditionally, sufficient resources have not been available to address the needs of each country or subregion in which the United States has strategic interest; therefore, it is essential that a determination be made as to where limited resources can best be used.

b. The capabilities of the threat against these countries or subregions should be analyzed. It is critical to identify and assess the strategic and operational capabilities of the enemy and the nature of the threat facing US allies. Examples of strategic capabilities include national leadership, communications, morale, popular support, and logistics. Operational capabilities would be similar at the regional level. To assist in evaluating the threat, the Instability Indicators Matrix located in Appendix C is one tool which could be useful. (Appendix C is not provided in this subcourse.

c. The principal vulnerabilities and deficiencies of the host nation or allies should be identified. The government or military forces of the host nation and/or allies may have internal deficiencies or vulnerabilities which are just as serious as the external threats facing them. Therefore, it is essential all strategic and operational deficiencies and vulnerabilities be clearly defined. These deficiencies may include such things as intelligence, equipment, organization, and procedures.

d. The overseas combatant commander's operational goals in the region must be articulated. Once the vulnerabilities and capabilities have been identified, the next step is to develop goals and objectives, in conjunction with the Country Team(s), that will improve or eliminate the major vulnerabilities of our allies and neutralize or cripple the strategic capabilities of enemy forces. Operational goals are those that are realistic and achievable by the overseas combatant commander. Such operational goals must be coordinated with the affected US Ambassador(s) and host nation(s).

e. In developing campaign plans, it is important to incorporate officials and agencies of the host government to the maximum extent permitted by security requirements. This not only enhances success through the integration of effort, but builds commitment to the plan and enhances the legitimacy of the host nation government in the eyes of its citizens.

f. The desired conditions that must be produced to support US Government and allied goal(s) must be identified. To reach this desired end state, the military campaign planner, in cooperation with representatives from other agencies, must decide how to apply the military instrument of national power to attain the political/diplomatic, economic, and informational conditions necessary to achieve success.

g. The military sequence of events which will support other US and allied agencies in the achievement of the desired condition(s) must be determined. The military sequence of events will be affected by political/diplomatic, economic, and informational goals and conditions. Military applications must be time-phased and coordinated with other US and allied agencies. The development of the campaign plan should also be accompanied by the parallel development of an infrastructure for command, control, and communications; intelligence; and logistics.

h. The required military resources must be determined.

(1) As allies develop strategic objectives and subordinate missions, force structure and resource requirements will emerge. These requirements should be identified as early as possible in order to properly assess the impact of failing to provide adequate resources.

(2) In the short of war environment, military resources are effective in supporting political/diplomatic, economic, and informational objectives if applied in coordination with the other instruments of national power. The Country Team assists in this coordination through identifying future security assistance funding and priorities. This process is critical as resources will affect the intensity and duration of the US and allied efforts and provide a psychological boost to the nations we support. Insufficient resources will generally tend to have the opposite effect and may be perceived as a lack of resolve on the part of the United States.

i. The encouragement of international support for US and allied policies and interests to neutralize support to opposition forces is mandatory. Psychological operations are a critical tool in accomplishing this goal and tend to be complex, crossing international boundaries. Because of this, international informational programs should be coordinated with adjacent countries and the host nation to ensure maximum benefits are realized.

4. Components of the Campaign Plan. Theater campaign planning in the short of war environment may be made up of several components. Although by no means exhaustive, these components could include command, control, and communications; intelligence; logistics; security assistance; medical; engineering; training; civil affairs; psychological operations; humanitarian assistance; public affairs; deception; aviation; transportation; host country support; chemical and biological defense; and counterdrug operations. Joint, interagency, and combined civil military operations are inherent in the short of war environment. Coordination and support must exist between each individual component to ensure consistency of purpose and unity of effort.

Specific applications for each component should be based on the operational categories in the short of war environment. However, a combatant commander's campaign plan may not address all the categories. Joint Pub 3-0 provides more detail in this area.

#### 5. Plan Execution.

a. The available force structure and resources, together with the national military strategy and combatant commander's strategy, normally provide the major impetus for campaign planning in all operations. Combatant commands must ensure the force structure and resource requirements generated by their campaign plans are reflected and given priority in appropriate Joint Strategic Planning System documents. For example, the combatant commanders' inputs to the Joint Strategy Review, National Military Strategy Document, Joint Military Net Assessment, Defense Planning Guidance, Program Objective Memorandum, Chairman's Program Assessment, Integrated Priority List, C3 Master Plan, and the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance should include short of war requirements in order to influence the long-term budget process, the near-term allocation of resources, and modification of the existing force structure.

b. During execution, the combatant commander uses all available feedback mechanisms to improve and tailor the campaign to the changing environment. Commanders require an assessment of how well operations complement the activities of other government agencies whose actions may be impacting on the theater. Such assessments can include estimates from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, situation reports, and intelligence reports from subordinate commands, appraisals from allies, and the Joint Center for Lessons Learned. The goal is to ensure all activities contribute to achieving national objectives.

## **CHAPTER VIII**

### **LOGISTICS**

#### 1. General.

a. Diversity of Operations. As discussed in Chapter I, the short of war environment encompasses a variety of operations within five general categories. Each of these categories has distinct support arrangements that should be tailored for the specific operation. This chapter will provide general guidelines applicable to all of the categories. Other Joint and Service publications cover specific details of logistics support for operations short of war.

b. Scope of Support. Logistics support in the short of war environment involves not only providing materiel and supplies to US and host nation forces, but may also involve determining potential host nation support capabilities; developing host nation logistics systems, infrastructure, and procedures; and training host nation logistics personnel. In the short of war environment, logistics elements often precede other military forces into the area of operations or may be the only forces deployed. Logistics preparation of the battlefield, as a specific task or as a collateral benefit of assistance to a host nation, is a key to successful operations. Logistics systems supporting either US or host nation forces must operate within the environmental constraints of the host nation and the legal and political constraints governing US involvement. Particular care must be exercised in limiting adverse effects on the host nation economy by exceeding its capacity to absorb high technology materiel or to accommodate the required logistics support.

c. Planning. Planning for support of operations short of war is a continuous process. Inclusion of the logistician at the outset during mission planning and force development is vital to the success of any operation. Once the concept of operation is determined, detailed logistics planning can proceed. Supporting plans should be as detailed as time will permit; however, since requirements may arise with a minimum of warning time and may occur in any theater of operation, it is prudent to be familiar with the short of war environment and its peculiar characteristics in advance of a decision to provide additional support to deploy, employ, and sustain forces.

d. Logistics Information. Logistics information is critical to the planning effort for the short of war environment. The provision of the necessary information will be facilitated by long-range preliminary planning to include area studies and target information folders. Such logistics information should include, as a minimum, the following factors for the host or supported country as well as for the adversary (as appropriate):

(1) Likelihood of combined operations and extent of logistics support to non-DOD agencies and allied forces.

(2) Foreign military logistics structure and national infrastructure capabilities.

(3) Environmental, geographical, climatological, topographical, and other factors that may affect logistics operations.

(4) Analysis of the capabilities of the host nations, regions, and the strategic lines of communication and capabilities to support the operation.

(5) Dimensions of other external support to the supported country or movement.

(6) Information on weapon systems and equipment interchangeability and interoperability.

e. Security Considerations. Once deployed, the dispersal of forces, the need to protect bases and installations, the need to provide protection for ground and air movement (to include protecting lines of communications), and the difficulties of acquiring local resources can complicate logistics support. Therefore, logistics facilities and stock levels should be kept to a minimum to reduce the security requirements and the risk of such supplies falling into hostile hands or being pilfered.

While local resources should be used to the maximum extent possible, such use should not adversely impact the local security forces, population, or economy. The combatant commander must also emphasize the importance of counterintelligence and security countermeasures to assist in the protection of vulnerable logistics stocks and facilities.

f. Tailoring Logistics Support. The structure of most logistics organizations allows units to be tailored to fit the assigned mission and situation. This characteristic should be imaginatively exploited to enable logistics organizations to meet the wide-range of potential deployment situations. Simplicity is an essential ingredient of logistics support to allow the flexibility necessary to continue effective support under demanding and adverse conditions.

g. Required Capabilities. Making maximum use of local resources, logistics flexibility, foresight, improvisation, and rapid response will be required to meet the needs of widely dispersed forces. In addition, a high degree of mobility will be necessary to reduce or eliminate excessive stocks in forward areas, restrict logistics installations to safe areas, and provide the capability to rapidly evacuate casualties. Required logistics capabilities include:

(1) Clearly understood command and control arrangements to include both the unilateral and combined support structures.

(2) Reliable logistics communications network.

(3) Secured and protected lines of communications to include stock control functions.

(4) Means to identify and exploit local resources to the maximum extent possible within the constraints of the political and social context of the situation. Civil affairs personnel, contracting officers, and/or ordering officers or Class A agents should be part of the first deployment package.

(5) Means to protect and operate logistics installations under all conditions.

(6) Resources for the provision and maintenance of facilities to include troop camps, logistics bases, lines of communication, hospitals, and aid in the civilian community.

(7) Means of establishing a medical treatment system and using the established casualty evacuation system.

(8) A flexible maintenance system to meet required operational availability rates.

(9) Means of collecting and collating logistics intelligence before and during operations.

(10) Means of supporting isolated forces separated from main bodies.

(11) Flexible and accountable financial arrangements to allow for payments of goods and services received and the recovery of costs for goods and services provided.

(12) Legal services for the interpretation of law and protection of assigned forces.

(13) A readily available corps of language qualified personnel conversant with both military logistics and host nation business practices and customs.

(14) Mobile logistics training teams.

(15) Veterinary services for the inspection and certification of locally purchased food items.

(16) Means of completing limited battle damage repair to aircraft, land equipment, small craft, and ships.

(17) Means of waste management to deal with logistics system's refuse as well as recycling serviceable assets.

(18) Contingency plans for the rapid evacuation and retrograde of US citizens and combat forces.

## 2. Logistics Guidelines.

a. The fundamental principles of logistics apply across the operational continuum. The application and adaptation of these principles to the short of war environment presents unique challenges for the logistician. When assisting host nation logistics personnel, the International Handbook for Logistics Systems Development provides a comprehensive guide for establishing logistics support in an underdeveloped nation. The following are guidelines for the establishment and operation

of a logistics system in a short of war environment:

- (1) Mission accomplishment.
- (2) Maximum economy of resources.
- (3) A flexible task force composition.
- (4) Ability to operate in any theater or country.

(5) Routine use of host nation support including local services, supplies, facilities, transportation, and definitive medical support (when it meets generally accepted standards of care) usually obtained through locally written contracts.

(6) Maximum use of existing fixed facilities such as lines of communications, ports, and airfields without impeding the local economy.

(7) Minimum handling of supplies. Short duration deployments (less than 90 days) should be supported by carefully tailored, preplanned resupply packages. The tailoring of such preplanned resupply packages must take into account the transportation and storage constraints within the area of operations. Where possible, forward stockage of resupply packages should also be considered.

(8) Maximum reliance on existing regional support bases and, when appropriate, continental US supply activities for supply requirements.

(9) Provisions for self-protection and passive protection measures for support units.

(10) Routine use of both intertheater and intratheater airlift until surface transportation can accommodate the deployment.

b. Operations short of war often require the ability to execute time-sensitive, discrete deployments. In addition to speed, the system used to mobilize and deploy must function in an environment where operations security is so restrictive as to preclude normal predeployment coordination. This environment may require significant tailoring of established mobilization procedures. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System provides the essential tools for this demanding planning process. In addition, Joint Pub 5-02.4, "Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures)," is a single source document for directing crisis response. It includes complete procedural checklists and emphasis on use of the Joint Deployment System and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network to facilitate the planning and execution of the operation for a time-sensitive situation.

**LESSON SEVEN**  
**PRACTICE EXERCISE**

The following items will test your grasp of the material covered in this lesson. There is only one correct answer for each item. When you have completed the exercise, check your answers with the answer key that follows. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that part of the lesson which contains the portion involved.

1. Campaign planning for OOTW is a deliberate process to ensure that all elements of national power are coordinated to support the military objectives.
  - a. True.
  - b. False.
  
2. The key difference between campaign planning for OOTW and that for war is --
  - a. the participation of one or more of the other services in the process.
  - b. the preeminent role of other agencies and host nations.
  - c. the requirement to plan for phasing actions in 60-day increments.
  - d. all of the above.
  
3. A distinguishing characteristic of planning for military actions in OOTW is that the objective(s) --
  - a. is normally the destruction of the main enemy force.
  - b. is far reaching, including logistics areas, lines of communication, and command and control systems.
  - c. is predominantly psychological.
  - d. requires a joint service effort to maximize the fire power available to the combatant commander at each phase of the operation.
  
4. The development of a campaign plan should have a parallel development of command, control, communications, intelligence, and logistics infrastructure.
  - a. True.
  - b. False.
  
5. Which of the following is a requirement that a logistics planner for OOTW would need to consider?
  - a. Financial arrangements to allow for payment for goods and services, as well as for recovery of costs for goods and services provided.
  - b. Mobile logistics training teams.
  - c. Language qualified personnel conversant with military logistics and host nation business practices and customs.
  - d. All of the above.

6. The insertion of logistics personnel before other military units and in some cases, the deployment of logistics personnel only, is one of the factors that differentiate OOTW from war.
  - a. True.
  - b. False.

**LESSON SEVEN PRACTICE EXERCISE  
ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK**

ITEM      Correct Answer

1.            b. False.

The rule of thumb for OOTW is that military operations support the efforts of other agencies. (p. 7-2)

2.            b. The preeminent role of other agencies and host nations. As in question one, the point here is that we (military) are rarely, if ever, the primary actor in OOTW. (pp. 7-2, 7-3)

3.            c. is predominantly psychological.

This is perhaps the single most significant difference between war planning and planning for OOTW. In OOTW, we generally are not "going for the high ground" but going for the mind. (p. 7-3)

4.            a. True. (p. 7-5)

5.            d. All of the above. (p. 7-9)

6.            a. True.

Failure to note this can lead to the deployment of unneeded combat assets, waste of life, and even risk to the mission by appearing more belligerent than intended. (p. 7-7)