PART E - THREAT INTEGRATION

When the evaluation of the threat is completed, the information is integrated with the analysis of the weather and terrain. The threat integration function is continuous and combines the analysis of the enemy's doctrine with the weather and terrain to determine how the enemy might actually fight within the specific battlefield environment.

Threat integration is accomplished through the development of situation, event, and decision support templates (DSTs). Doctrinal templates and weather and terrain factor overlays provide the basic tools for threat integration. Figure 2-31 shows the developmental steps in the threat integration process.

Figure 2-31. Developmental steps in the threat integration process

1. Situation Templating.

The initial template prepared during threat-integration is the situation template. The situation template is basically a doctrinal situation template with weather and terrain constraints applied. It shows how the enemy might deviate from doctrinal dispositions or adjust frontages, depths, or echelon spacing to account for weather and terrain effects. Doctrinal templates and the MCOO (or the combined obstacle overlay and avenues of approach overlay) are the basis for developing situation templates.

a. Template Development. Situation templates focus on operations in specific mobility corridors within avenues of approach. They graphically depict how threat forces might adjust doctrinal formations to move, shoot, and communicate within these mobility corridors. Situation templates are prepared not only for the obvious mobility corridors but for the difficult corridors offering the enemy the potential of achieving surprise. Based on these assumed adjustments, we can then determine where the enemy commander might place ground surveillance radars, CPs, communication sites, weapons systems, combat support elements, CSS facilities, and concentrated air assets.

As an enemy force moves along a mobility corridor, it might fight through or bypass built-up areas, constrict its frontage to pass through choke points, and negotiate water obstacles. As this occurs, areas within the mobility corridor begin to relate to terrain and situation-dependent actions you must take.

Situation templating is basically a visual technique. By placing a doctrinal template over a segment of a mobility corridor, the analyst visually notes where terrain and weather factors make enemy deployments extremely difficult or impossible. The analyst then adjusts unit or equipment dispositions to depict where these elements might actually be deployed in the situation. It is obvious the enemy has other options, and the analyst tries to view the situation through the eyes of the enemy commander. The enemy's desire to appear ambiguous and to achieve surprise are also considered. These factors are integrated with the most likely tactical alternatives open to the enemy.

Situation templating should not be the work of a single analyst. Three analysts using the same doctrinal template will develop three different situations for the same area. As each of these situations will probably depict a possible enemy alternative, no single one will provide the correct solution. Each situation must therefore be analyzed, with the possibility that several templates depicting alternative dispositions may be developed for a single area.

As situation templates are visualizations of potential enemy actions at a certain time and place on the battlefield, they change as enemy forces move along the mobility corridor. As enemy forces move, their actions continue to be influenced by weather, terrain, and the tactical situation. Since this movement is sequential, situation templates are sequential snapshots of how the enemy force might appear as it moves.

The credibility of situation templates is directly related to the accuracy of the threat evaluation, terrain analysis, and weather analysis processes.

Figures 2-32 through 2-35 show the development of situation templates.

A doctrinal template of an MRR as the lead element of a division is overlayed on a specific area. It is obvious the doctrinal frontages, depths, and unit configurations do not conform to the confines of the terrain.

The dispositions of the regimental elements are realigned to conform to the terrain. These alignments are changed to form a series of snapshots showing how the regiment might move through the terrain.



Figure 2-32. Doctrinal template. MRR as a lead element of an MRD



Figure 2-33. Situation template: MRR as a lead element of an MRD

Unit frontages, depths, and echelon spacing are adjusted to fit the terrain but kept as close to doctrine as possible.



Figure 2-34. Situation template. MRR with unit dispositions adjusted to terrain constraints

The final snapshot of the regiment's move through the mobility corridor reflects a type deployment for a MRR. The final snapshot would be situation dependent.

Situation templating is not performed independently and without knowledge of current dispositions. In fact, use of a doctrinal template on a current SITMAP will enable the analyst to predict the probable locations of enemy elements by type and echelon, based upon current weather and terrain constraints. The resultant situation provides a more complete picture of the situation and provides a basis for event templating and collection planning to confirm or deny the existence of the probable enemy elements. To distinguish confirmed enemy elements and activities from units estimated through doctrinal templating, estimated unit symbols are drawn with broken or dashed lines.

b. Space and Time Analyses. Space and time analyses are important in developing situation templates through their use in the wargaming process. The projections of enemy activities based on space and time analyses play a key role in situation and target development. Space analysis determines whether a



Figure 2-35. Situation template: type deployment for an MRR

particular unit or battlefield function can maneuver or use specific terrain in a specific situation. Avenues of approach and mobility corridors determine whether or not an area can accommodate maneuver. OB data and the intelligence data base assist in the development of zones of action for enemy offensive and defensive frontages, depths, and airspace. By reviewing the battlefield and using space analysis, the analyst can determine where the enemy is, whether the enemy is able to use the terrain for their purposes, and the tactical adjustments required to operate within specific mobility corridors.

2. Event Templating and the Event Analysis Matrix.

Situation templating is the basis for the second template prepared during the threat integration process --the event template.

a. The Event Template. Event templating identifies and analyzes significant battlefield events and activities which provide indicators of enemy courses of action. It is a projection of what will probably occur if the enemy adopts a particular course of action. By recognizing what the enemy can do, and by comparing it with what the enemy is doing, we can predict what the enemy probably will do next. Event templating is as critical to offensive and air-associated operations as it is to defensive operations. During offensive operations, the event templating development process is expanded to include event templates depicting how the enemy commander perceives the friendly attack and how the enemy might potentially counterattack. In addition to determining the particular defensive courses of action the enemy might adopt, these additional templates help the analyst predict where the enemy can be expected to employ enemy intelligence collection assets, and where and when any potential counterattack may originate. The same is true for air and air-associated operations. Event templating relates airspace activities and events to points on the ground, and projects how the enemy might use airspace in support of a particular course of action. Airspace event templating requires a detailed knowledge of aircraft flight profiles, attack techniques, and service-ceiling limitations, and of air defense radar and weapons systems ranges and capabilities.

(1) Ground Templates. The predictions and projections developed through event templating are an important factor in determining the enemy's posture and movement. Knowledge of when and where activity is likely to occur on the battlefield provides indicators of enemy intentions, or verifies that projected events have or have not occurred. Battlefield events are predicted through situation development. Situation development takes place during the prehostility or predeployment phase of operations and the results are verified or refuted during actual combat.

Verification of a specific situation or event takes place during the process, analysis, and production phases of the intelligence cycle.

The event template depicts named areas of interest (NAIs) along each mobility corridor. These aid the relationship of events between separate avenues of approach and mobility corridors. It provides a means of analyzing the sequence of activities and events that should occur for each potential enemy course of action and how they relate to one another. The event template is developed by wargaming each potential enemy course of action from the point where friendly or enemy activity begins to the final objectives. Figure 2-36 shows an example of a ground operation event template.



Figure 2-36. Ground event template

(2) Air Templates. Airspace (third dimension) analysis may be included on an event template or as a separate event template. Specifically, enemy air avenues of approach and

mobility corridors and air named areas of interest (NAIs) are depicted. Normally, air avenues of approach and mobility corridors conform closely to ground mobility corridors, but can be adjusted with respect to aircraft maximum and minimum operating altitudes, attack profiles, and attack techniques. Both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft employ low-altitude-attack profiles within selected mobility corridors. Helicopters employ various attack techniques in direct support of ground forces during all phases of operations. Fixed-wing aircraft provide both CAS and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) support, and strike fixed and semi-fixed targets beyond artillery and missile ranges.

As with the ground event template, the air event template assists the collection manager in formulating intelligence collection requirements. However, due to the nature of the airspace medium and the great speeds at which aircraft move through this medium, NAIs must be keyed to points on the ground, and time-phase lines (TPLs) are not effective for time analysis.

Aircraft need not adhere to friendly or enemy unit boundaries. Therefore, the collection manager bases the collection requirements on specific avenues of approach and mobility corridors; on knowledge of aircraft attack profiles and techniques; and on the capabilities of air defense systems. As aircraft are tied to airfields or forward-area refueling and rearming points (FARPs), these facilities also play a key role in the development of airspace collection requirements. Figure 2-37 is an example of an air event template.

The event templating process and the wargaming employed in its development become more formal at higher echelons. At brigade and battalion, the event templating process may be entirely a mental exercise. However, at division, corps, and EAC the development of formal event graphics is necessary to support the analysis of probable enemy courses of action over multiple avenues of approach and mobility corridors. Development of these graphics is also necessary to direct the multiple and varied collection, reconnaissance, and target acquisition assets controlled by these echelons.

As forces move along avenues of approach and mobility corridors, critical areas become apparent. These areas are critical because they are where significant events and activities will take place.

It is within these areas that targets will appear. These critical areas are designated as NAIs during the event templating process.

(3) Named Areas of Interest. An NAI is a point or area along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor where activity will confirm or deny a particular course of action. NAIs can be



Figure 2-37. Air event template

a specific point on the ground, a specific movement route, or an area. When possible, NAIs are placed in numbered sequence along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor. This facilitates the calculation of movement times between specific NAIs and limits confusion as to the specific avenue or corridor under consideration. Figure 2-38 shows the symbols for point, area, and route NAIs.



Figure 2-38. NAI symbols

NAIs facilitate intelligence collection, R&S asset employment, and intelligence analysis because --

- o They focus attention on areas where the enemy force must appear if it has selected a particular mobility corridor.
- o They delineate when and where the enemy will employ the collection, R&S, and fire support and counterattack elements during friendly offensive operations.
- o They frame militarily significant events by time and location.
- o Events or activities in one NAI can be compared with events occurring at NAIs in other mobility corridors to provide a basis for determining enemy intentions.
- o Information thresholds can be assigned to each NAI. These confirm or deny that the expected activity has occurred within the established time limits.
- o Events within NAIs can be analyzed for indicators against which intelligence, R&S, and target acquisition assets can be directed. NAIs are the basis for intelligence collection planning.

(4) Time-phase Lines. TPLs help in tracking enemy movements and assist the collection manager in directing collection assets. They provide a graphic means of comparing the enemy's mobility capability along separate avenues of approach and mobility corridors. TPLs can be computed for all types of enemy movement and operations. In the deep operations they are used to monitor movement along LOC. In close operations they are used to monitor actual enemy formations. In rear operations they are used to monitor the movement of enemy airborne and air assault or OMG forces towards their objectives. TPLs are based on doctrinal rates of movement. These rates of movement are based upon actual experience with the enemy, enemy doctrinal writings, or on peacetime wargaming. Movement rates are adjusted to compensate for the effects of weather and terrain and for friendly actions. During actual operations, TPLs are adjusted to conform to actual enemy rates of movement. Figure 2-39 shows doctrinal rates of movement normally used in TPL computation.

The times calculated between NAIs are used to establish TPLs. The initial TPL is identified as "H" (the hour at the enemy FLOT), and successively as H+1, H+2, and so forth, depending upon

both the enemy's doctrinal movement rate and the weather and terrain constraints.



Figure 2-39. Doctrinal enemy-movement rates

Selected NAIs are often keyed to TPLs, or TPLs themselves may become NAIs. TPLs do not replace NAIs. TPLs are transcribed from the event template to the DST across avenues of approach or mobility corridors, thereby reducing your uncertainties about the maximum extent of the enemy's advance within specific timeframes.

During defensive operations, TPLs are developed using the doctrinal enemy movement rates shown in Figure 2-39. However, during offensive operations, friendly TPLs are developed in accordance with the offensive situation and the commander's concept of the operation. They are used as a coordination and collection planning mechanism and are transcribed onto the DST in the same manner as enemy TPLs during defensive operations.

Event templates of potential enemy counterattack options should include TPLs to assist in determining where the enemy can be expected to launch a counterattack. In this case, "H" hour should be the time the enemy is expected to begin the counterattack, and H+1, and so forth, are computed based on doctrinal or actual movement rates.

b. The Event Analysis Matrix. The event analysis matrix supports the event template. It correlates expected events and activities within individual NAIs and adds the dimension of time. By employing enemy doctrinal movement rates and analyzing the effects of the terrain and weather on mobility, the time required to move between NAIs along each avenue of approach or mobility corridor can be estimated. Separate event analysis matrixes should be prepared for each avenue of approach or mobility corridor. Figure 2-40 shows examples of event analysis matrixes.

The estimated times required to move between NAIs are expressed in terms of not earlier than (NET) and not later than (NLT) times. The NET time is the earliest the lead element of an enemy formation can be expected to arrive at or to activate an NAI. NLT is the latest estimated time a lead element of an enemy formation can be expected to activate an NAI.

AVENUE OF APPROACH — COORDINATES:

MOBILITY CORRIDOR: 1 — COORDINATES: PA 2071 - PA 1076

NAI / ACTIVITY	DISTANCE (KM)	RATE OF MOVEMENT	NET / NLT	TIME OBSERVED / TIME CONFIRMED
1 ENEMY RECON ELEMENTS/ GROUPS AND PATROLS MOVE ALONG MC 1	—	—	— / H-HOUR	
2 ACTIVITY AS PER NAI 1	18 KM	20 KM/H	H+54 MIN / H+1/ 9 MIN	
3 RECON ELEMENTS ASSUME SCREEN POSITIONS	20 KM	20 KM/H	H+1/ 54 MIN / H+2/ 24 MIN	

AVENUE OF APPROACH — COORDINATES:

MOBILITY CORRIDOR: 6 — COORDINATES: PA 4850 - PA 2840

NAI / ACTIVITY	DISTANCE (KM)	RATE OF MOVEMENT	NET / NLT	TIME OBSERVED / TIME CONFIRMED
25 ENEMY MRB's CONDUCTING NIGHT RIVER CROSSING WITH ILLUMINATION	—	—	— / H-HOUR	
18 ENEMY COUNTER-ATTACK WITH REINFORCED TE	20 KM	20 KM/H	H+1 / H+1/ 15 MIN	
13 ENEMY REINFORCED MRB SHIFTING INTO PREBATTLE FORMATION	18 KM	20 KM/H	H+1/ 54 MIN / H+2/ 24 MIN	

Figure 2-40. Event analysis matrixes

NET and NLT times are computed using the doctrinal enemy movement rates shown in Figure 2-39. During combat, these rates are adjusted to conform to actual movement rates. NET and NLT times can be expressed in terms of actual time, or in terms of time beginning with H-hour (H+1: 15, H+2: 54, and so forth). The commander or actual command requirements determine how these times are depicted on the event analysis matrix.

3. Event Templating and Collection Management.

Before combat, the event template and the event analysis matrix depict probable enemy courses of action and provide a basis for comparing friendly and enemy courses of action. During combat the event template and the supporting event analysis matrix focus on probable enemy courses of action.

Event templating enables the G2 and S2 or collection managers to develop precise, prioritized collection requirements based on probable enemy courses of action. This serves to maximize the effectiveness of limited collection resources over extended areas and against a vast array of targets. It provides answers to the questions of where to look, when to look, and for what to look. Together with the situation template, the event template and the event analysis matrix assist the collection manager in establishing collection priorities based on the most likely enemy courses of action. Movers and emitters, the primary indicators of events and activities, can be framed by time and location, allowing the collection manager to determine the optimum mix of collection assets.

Event templating forms the basis for constructing the decision support template (DST). As such, event templating serves the G3 or S3 and the FSO or fire support element (FSE) by telling them where and when to shoot, jam, and maneuver, and what to shoot, jam, and maneuver against.

Event templating is the vital link between the success of the commander's tactical concept, intelligence requirements, and the collection plan.

4. Decision Support Templating.

Event templating provides the basis for decision support templating. The DST is essentially a combined intelligence estimate and operations estimate in graphic form. It relates the detail of the event template to decision points significant to the commander, and identifies critical battlefield areas, events, and activities which require tactical decisions by time and location. The DST does not dictate decisions to the commander, but indicates points where a decision may be required. As such, the DST provides a structured basis for using judgment and

experience to reduce battlefield uncertainties and to make decisions.

Development of the DST is the function of the commander's targeting triad. This triad consists of the G2 or S2, G3 or S3, and fire-support coordinator (FSCOORD) or FSE. However, to be complete and effective, the DST must be developed as a result of a total staff effort. Among the staff members who can be expected to contribute routinely to the development of the DST are the G4 or S4, aviation officer, air defense officer, engineer officer, battlefield deception officer, communications and electronics officer, and chemical officer. Other staff members such as the medical officer may contribute to the DST's development in special situations which require their expertise. Although it is developed under the coordination of the G2 or S2, once complete, the DST becomes an operational document and is therefore, briefed to the commander by the G3 or S3.

You make tactical decisions in response to specific battlefield situations and enemy actions. These decisions involve the concentration of combat power for close operations; the delay, weakening, and manipulation of enemy follow-on forces; in-deep operations; and the placement of assets and development of CI (counterintelligence) and security functions for rear operations. These decisions are based on your concept for fighting all three phases of the AirLand Battle.

Event templating identifies areas where significant events and activities can be expected to occur and where targets can be expected to appear. Decision support templating identifies areas or points where targets can be attacked, or where specific actions can be taken in support of your concept of the operation. It then relates these points and the associated battlefield events to your decision-making requirements. This is done either through the development of target areas of interest and decision points (DPs) or through the equation of TPLs with a decision support or operating factors matrix.

a. Target Areas of Interest. The initial step in developing a DST is to determine where, along each avenue of approach or mobility corridor, the commander can influence the battle or action by fire, maneuver, or jamming. The areas where you can delay, disrupt, destroy, or manipulate the enemy force, or which are suitable for attacking HVTs, are identified as target areas of interest (TAIs). TAIs are normally areas which were previously identified as NAIs.

A TAI is an engagement point or area, usually along an avenue of approach or mobility corridor, where the interdiction of an enemy force by fire, maneuver, or jamming will reduce or deprive that force of a particular capability. Interdiction may also cause

the enemy to abandon its capability. Interdiction may also cause the enemy to abandon or adopt a particular course of action, or force the employment of unusual support to continue operations. If a TAI is intended to force the enemy to use unusual support assets, the TAI must be terrain-dependent, and must inhibit or deny movement.

Sample TAIs include the following:

- Bridges.
- Road junctions.
- Choke points.
- DZs and LZs.
- Known fording sites.
- FARPS.
- Rear-area refueling and rearming points (RARPs).

TAIs can be identified either as point or area TAIs. Point TAIs designate specific target areas for fire support or EW assets. They are normally used in conjunction with assets which require at least a moderate degree of accuracy to be effective. Area TAIs are normally more terrain-dependent and are used with assets which are employed over larger areas (family of artillery scatterable mines (FASCAM), smoke, chemical agents). Figure 2-41 shows the symbols for point and area TAIS.



Figure 2-41. TAI symbols

TAIs which are essential to uninterrupted enemy movement may become HVTs. Other areas may be designated as TAIs because they are good interdiction points along routes over which HVTs are expected to move.

TAIs are significant because --

- Targets constitute a basis for the allocation of deep attack resources. Combat resources are limited in terms of capability, quantity, and the time constraints within which they can be employed.

- o Targets are subsets of events. If a target does not appear, either through sensing or by analytical deduction, then the event with which it is associated may not have occurred. The massing of artillery in support of a breakthrough operation, or the concentration of forces as part of the second echelon are examples of events which can be confirmed based on target analysis.

- o Targets are the basis for determining the combat power of the enemy along specific mobility corridors. The commander must use long-range fires to reduce enemy combat power before these forces reach the forward battle area.

The identification of TAIs is a joint intelligence and operations staff and FSE effort. The intelligence staff evaluates enemy forces and the effects of interdiction on their capabilities. The operations staff and the FSE consider the capabilities and availability of the interdiction resources, the effects of the interdiction effort on friendly mission accomplishment, and the priorities for the employment of available resources.

(1) High-value Targets. Determining TAIs involves target value analysis (TVA). TVA, like the identification of TAIs, is a joint intelligence, operations, and FSE effort. TVA considers enemy force doctrine and provides a basis for locating elements which are key to enemy mission accomplishment. These elements are designated as HVTs. The specific elements identified as HVTs are situation dependent, and may include CPs, communications sites, logistics sites, transportation assets, artillery concentrations, engineer assets, IEW elements, and chemical and nuclear weapons delivery means.

(2) High-payoff Targets. A second category of targets is known as high-payoff targets (HPTs). HPTs are targets, the location and destruction of which provide a significant advantage. The destruction of an HPT deprives the enemy of a specific capability or is advantageous to friendly operations. The commander in support of the concept of the operation designates HPTs. For example, if the enemy must conduct a deliberate river crossing over a wide, deep river within the friendly sector as part of a probable attack, engineer assets are key to the enemy's success. Without these engineer assets the crossing would be impossible; the friendly commander, after being briefed on this HVT, may designate the engineer assets as HPT because their destruction would deprive the enemy of river-crossing capability. If the commander designates the engineer assets as an HPT, the HPT is prioritized with other HPTs for location by intelligence personnel and for subsequent attack or EW targeting.

Doctrinal and situation templating, as well as a detailed knowledge of enemy doctrine and weapons capabilities, help the analyst locate potential HVTs on the event template and DST. This helps to cue collection assets to the location of possible HVTs during event templating, and to designate TAIs during decision support templating.

b. Decision Points. After TAIs are selected, decision points (DPs) are identified. The identification and location of DPs heavily depend on the availability of fire support, maneuver, combat support, and CSS systems. Therefore, the selection of DPs is primarily a G3 or S3 function, based on the G2 or S2 input of the threat. However, the selection of DPs requires the efforts of the G3 or S3, the G2 or S2, the FSCOORD or FSO, their respective staffs, and the principal staff officers of the CS and CSS elements.

(1) DPs identify events, areas, and points on the battlefield where tactical decisions are required, and when these decisions must be made. DPs do not dictate decisions to the commander; they indicate only where tactical decisions should be made in order to have the most effect on the enemy. Decisions must be made early enough to have the desired effect on the enemy. However, they cannot be made until there are indications particular battlefield events will occur, and their locations confirmed with a high degree of confidence. Therefore, the placement of DPs must be far enough in advance of the expected location of the event or activity to ensure sufficient time to effectively implement the required decision, and close enough to allow confirmation the expected event will occur. Factors affecting DP placement include the time required --

- o For the intelligence collection or surveillance asset to receive the news the event has occurred.
- o To process the information.
- o To advise the commander of the activity.
- o For the commander to make a cognitive decision.
- o To disseminate the decision to the proper fire support, maneuver, or combat support or service support asset.
- o For the asset to implement the decision.

(2) Depending upon the level of command, the commander will have a variety of fire, maneuver, and EW options available for employment. DPs are selected based upon these options, and their ability to achieve the desired results against the TAI. Whatever means are selected, some battlefield conditions may permit extensive DP preplanning, while others force the selection of DPs based on immediate missions. As a general rule, DPs for preplanned missions are normally closer to the respective TAIs

than those for immediate missions. Figure 2-42 provides a set of

ASSET	DECISION IMPLEMENTATION TIME
Maneuver elements	Based on METT-T
Direct fire weapons	Minimum leadtime required
Artillery (including smoke and illumination)	5 to 15 minutes (system dependent)
FASCAM (artillery-delivered mines)	7 to 20 minutes
Attack helicopter units (close 1 to 15 km from FLOT	1 to 2 hours
Attack helicopter units (deep >15 km from FLOT)	3 hours
Preplanned aviation or CAS	20 minutes (minimum)
On-call aviation or CAS	Up to 2 hours
Joint suppression of enemy air defense (JSEAD)	Up to 2 hours to coordinate 5 minutes to execute
Hasty NBC decontamination	30 minutes
Detailed NBC decontamination	2 to 4 hours
Air Force intelligence collectors:	
RF-4 Preplanned	12 to 24 hours
RF-4 Immediate (high priority)	30 minutes to 3 hours
U-2/TR-1 Preplanned	24 to 36 hours
U-2/TR-1 Diversion	5 to 6 hours
SR-71	72 hours
Ground or Airborne IEW	30 minutes (minimum)

Figure 2-42. Basic guidelines for placement of DPs

basic guidelines to assist in determining the placement of DPs for selected assets.

(3) DPs equate time to specific points on the battlefield and are determined by comparing times required to implement decisions, enemy movement rates, and distances. Enemy doctrinal movement rates, adjusted to compensate for the effects of weather, terrain, and friendly interdiction are used as the basis for computation. DPs may be keyed to TPLs. When DPs are keyed to enemy TPLs, the TPLs are based on doctrinal enemy movement rates adjusted to compensate for the effects of weather, terrain, and interdiction (from the event template). When DPs are keyed to friendly TPLs, the TPLs are based on the commander's concept of the operation.

DSTs depict TAIs, DPs, TPLs, avenues of approach and mobility corridors, objectives, and the current enemy situation (from the current SITMAP and situation templates). Figure 2-43 shows an example of a DST.

(4) During friendly offensive operations, the focus of decision support templating shifts from interdicting attacking enemy forces to determining where you can best employ assets in support of your own attack. However, it reflects where the enemy is expected to place DP and TAIs. It also shows where and when the enemy might counterattack and the LOCs to be used to reinforce enemy defending forces. This requires a reorientation of analyst perspectives concerning the following:

- The enemy will likely withdraw under pressure along the offensive mobility corridors. TAIs must be identified along withdrawal routes to halt and destroy the enemy in detail during the close operations.

- As the enemy forces are penetrated, the risk of tank-heavy counterattacks on the flanks increases greatly. The DST must show where these counterattacks might occur, and which routes they can employ. TAIs are identified to permit the interdiction of counterattacking forces.

- The enemy is likely to reinforce defending or withdrawing forces with the defending unit's second echelon, the second echelon of the unit's parent organization, or with follow-on elements. The LOC which these reinforcements might employ must be identified and TAIs established. These TAIs will probably be well within the enemy's rear area, requiring the use of friendly long-range operations assets.

- The enemy commander will have a variety of fire, maneuver, and EW options to employ in the defense.

These will be dictated by enemy doctrine and the current situation. Enemy DPs and TAIs for the



Figure 2-43. Example of a DST

employment of these options must be identified in order to prepare friendly forces for their potential use.

(5) Normally, a single DST is not sufficient to support all the different decision support functions required during offensive operations. Therefore, it is necessary to construct additional DSTs. Individual DSTs or separate overlays for a DST should be prepared for the friendly offensive, enemy defensive, red enemy reinforcement, counterattack options, and operations. As it is expected the enemy will use all available assets to attempt to blunt the friendly thrust, DSTs for both friendly and enemy air operations also should be prepared.

(6) The air and air-associated operations DST differs significantly from the ground DST. Although the template depicts TAIs and avenues of approach or mobility corridors, it is concerned with air defense, rotary-wing aviation, CAS, battlefield air interdiction, airborne and air assault operations, and the placement of the facilities and areas which support these operations. TPLs are not depicted on the air and air-associated operation DST because of the high speed of aircraft and the rapid effect they can have on operations. A detailed knowledge of aircraft flight and attack profiles, friendly and enemy air defense capabilities, terrain masking, and the current air OB are critical to the development of the air and air-associated operations DST. Figure 2-44 shows a basic air DST for a defensive operation.

(7) During rear area operations, decision support templating helps the rear area commander identify those areas where the commander can deploy air defense, CI, and rear-area security elements. Decision support templating also identifies where the rear area commander can place support elements with the greatest degree of security consistent with mission accomplishment.

The rear area commander is concerned with security and CI, as well as with any potential enemy maneuver forces which might enter the area and disrupt operations. The rear area commander must be concerned with specific points along avenues of approach or mobility corridors and with specific events or sequences of events that have been pinpointed on the unconventional warfare SITMAP or population status overlay. These points or events are identified as TAIs.

(8) As combat assets are limited, the rear area commander must employ all means against identified TAIs. This includes effective air defense, the effective defensive posturing of rear area units, the aggressive employment of rear area security units, an active CI effort, and the expedient use of



Figure 2-44. Air DST

civil affairs and PSYOP units. Samples of rear area TAIs include the following:

- o LZs and DZs.
- o Road junctions.
- o Forest paths and trails.
- o Small groups of individuals (especially in civilian clothes) attempting to move through or evade detection in the rear area.
- o Areas with groups or individuals sympathetic to the enemy cause.
- o Guerilla and insurgent encampments or headquarters areas.
- o Known terrorist operating or headquarters areas.

(9) TAIs normally are identified along high-speed avenues of approach into the rear area. These TAIs and their associated DPs are identified with the consideration that the rear commander will be forced to rely on assets outside their control to effectively stop any major penetration of the area by major enemy forces.

The rear area DST shows TAI DPs, potential enemy objectives, and friendly HVTs (airfields, nuclear depots, missile sites). The template is supplemented by the unconventional warfare SITMAP and the population status overlay. Figures 3-45 and 3-46 show DSTs for airborne or air attack and operational maneuver group (OMG) operations.

c. The Decision Support Template or Operational Factors Matrix. In addition to the standard method of developing the DST, it can also be developed with decisions keyed to an operational factors matrix. This is especially effective for offensive operations, where you can base operational decisions on the TPLs.

The decisions required at each TPL are depicted in the operational factors matrix which is placed immediately below the DST operational graphic. The decisions required at each TPL are determined by following the phase lines down into the corresponding column of the matrix. The operational factors normally considered at the tactical level include the following:

- o Intelligence.
- o Maneuver (including aviation).
- o Fire support.
- o ADA.
- o Engineer.
- o NBC.
- o CSS.
- o Command and control (C^2).

These factors can be addressed in any order. However, this sequence generally corresponds to the sequence in which the factors occur within the five-paragraph OPORD. The operational factors may change based on the level of war or the commander's requirements. Figure 2-47 shows an example of a DST keyed to an operational factors matrix.

Intelligence provides the basis for tactical planning and execution. Detailed planning must be accomplished during static periods; as fluid, dynamic battlefield situations will not allow time for detailed planning. Event and DSTs are the result of detailed intelligence planning that can be accomplished during static periods. They are the basis for all tactical planning and provide the filters through which all information and intelligence are directed to the commander. They satisfy the commander's needs, as expressed in PIRs and IRs, because they are keyed to important battlefield events and the time and space factors known to be of interest to the commander. The DST is the vital link between your intelligence needs and the decisions and actions required of you and your and staff.



Figure 2-45. Division rear operations DST (level 3) airborne or air attack



Figure 2-46. Division rear operations DST (level 3)

You are vitally concerned with wresting the initiative from the enemy; that is, forcing the enemy commander to choose a less desirable course of action through design rather than through chance. The DST frames your opportunities and options and ensures timely and accurate decisions, thus providing the means to influence enemy actions rather than just react to them.



Figure 2-47. Example of a DST keyed to an operational factors matrix